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perma.cc/R8N2-UPHF]	 (“Trump	 is	 vilifying	 the	 professional	 bureaucracy,	 that	 vast	

















Trump	 loyalist.	 See	 id.	 at	 1123;	 see	 also	 Charlie	 Savage,	 Inspector	 General	 Fired	 by	
Trump	Urges	Whistle-Blowers	‘to	Bravely	Speak	Up,’	N.Y.	TIMES	(Apr.	6,	2020),	https://	
www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/politics/michael-atkinson-inspector-general	



















venting	 cronyism	and	political	 patronage.6	 The	 loss	of	 such	protec-
tions	 is	 particularly	 problematic	 for	 officials	 engaged	 in	
administrative	 adjudication	 because	 an	 unbiased	 decision-maker	 is	
















2018)	 (relying	on	Lucia	 to	exempt	ALJ	appointments	 from	competitive	 civil	 service	
hiring	processes);	Memorandum	from	the	Solicitor	General	to	Agency	General	Coun-
sels	on	Guidance	on	Administrative	Law	Judges	After	Lucia	v.	SEC	(S.	Ct.)	9	(July	2018)	




























these	concerns	by	providing	 for	a	separation	of	 functions	 in	agency	
adjudication	and	applying	civil	service	protections	to	agency	adjudi-















































ity.	 Indeed,	 adjudicatory	 independence	may	work	 against	 impartial	
adjudication	if	it	prevents	agencies	from	removing	or	disciplining	ad-
judicators	who	exhibit	bias.	Accordingly,	agencies	have	a	 legitimate	












Accounting	 Oversight	 Board13	 cast	 doubt	 on	 the	 constitutionality	 of	











(OPM),	 which	manages	 the	 Federal	 work	 force;	 Federal	 Labor	 Relations	 Authority	
(FLRA),	which	oversees	Federal	labor-management	relations;	and	the	[Merit	Systems	
Protection	Board	(MSPB)].”	About	MSPB,	MERIT	SYS.	PROT.	BD.,	https://www.mspb.gov/	






















tion	 that	would	weaken	good-cause	 removal	protections	 for	ALJs.18	
These	developments,	in	turn,	make	ALJs	more	susceptible	to	informal,	



























tion”);	see	also	 id.	 (indicating	that	MSPB	review	must	be	“suitably	deferential	 to	the	
determination	of	the	Department	Head”).	
	 19.	 See	infra	Part	II.C.	























sider	 how	 judicial	 decisions	 and	 executive	 actions	 raise	 concerns	
about	the	stability	and	sufficiency	of	current	protections	for	ALJ	inde-


















































































to	 assess	 whether	 a	 violation	 has	 occurred.	 Thus,	 “quasi-judicial”	
agency	decisions	are	a	well-established	feature	of	administrative	law.	
Over	 time,	 the	Supreme	Court	has	developed	 two	distinct	doc-
trines	that	accommodate	most	forms	of	administrative	adjudication.	
First,	Congress	is	generally	free	to	delegate	adjudication	of	so-called	
“public	 rights”	 to	 administrative	 agencies.30	 Second,	 administrative	
agencies	may	function	as	adjunct	factfinders	for	the	courts,31	provided	














cases	 generally	 indicate,	 without	 extended	 discussion,	 that	 adjudication	 of	 public	




























Of	 course,	 impartiality	 may	 mean	 different	 things	 in	 different	
contexts.38	 Bias	 may	 arise	 because	 of	 a	 decision-maker’s	 personal	
prejudices	or	a	relationship	to	the	parties	in	a	particular	case.39	Our	
 

































cure	 ALJ	 independence,	 by	 which	 we	mean	 freedom	 from	 political	
pressures	that	compromise	the	ALJ’s	ability	to	decide	cases	on	their	
merits	in	light	of	the	facts	in	the	record	and	the	applicable	law.	The	
expectation	 that	 ALJs	 will	 follow	 valid	 agency	 policies	 adopted	
through	legislative	rules,	precedential	adjudications,	or	other	appro-
priate	means	is	not	inconsistent	with	adjudicatory	independence.	On	











financial	stake	 in	 the	outcome,42	a	relationship	with	one	of	 the	par-
ties,43	or	prior	involvement	with	the	case.44	






rulings,	 questioning	 of	 the	 employer’s	 witnesses,	 and	 alleged	 expressions	 of	 impa-
tience	or	anger).	


























cerns	 that	 fueled	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 APA,	 which	 established	 im-
portant	protections	for	the	independence	of	ALJs	(although	they	were	
called	hearing	examiners	at	the	time	of	the	APA’s	adoption).47	First,	

























































































cipline	 and	 independent	 salary	determinations—mirror	 the	protec-
tions	that	Article	III	affords	federal	judges,	albeit	in	somewhat	weak-
























































itive	 merit	 selection	 and	 good-cause	 requirements	 for	 removal	 or	
other	disciplinary	actions.64	In	the	last	decade,	however,	a	combina-

























































herein	 otherwise	 provided	 for,	 and	 which	 shall	 be	 established	 by	
law.”68	Second,	it	authorizes	Congress	to	vest	the	power	to	appoint	“in-
ferior	Officers	.	.	.	in	the	President	alone,	in	the	Courts	of	Law,	or	in	the	
Heads	of	Departments.”69	 The	Appointments	Clause	only	 applies	 to	
“Officers	 of	 the	 United	 States,”	 which	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 con-








	 67.	 See	 Peter	 M.	 Shane,	 Trump’s	 Quiet	 Power	 Grab,	 ATLANTIC	 (Feb.	 26,	 2020),	
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/trumps-quiet-power-grab/	









Clause,	 then,	 the	 critical	 issues	 for	 the	 appointment	of	ALJs	 are	 (1)	
whether	they	are	officers	of	the	United	States	and	(2)	if	so,	whether	
they	qualify	as	“principal”	or	inferior	officers.	












In	 Lucia,	 the	 SEC	 had	 initiated	 an	 administrative	 enforcement	
proceeding	against	the	defendant	and	his	investment	company,	alleg-
ing	violations	of	securities	laws.75	An	ALJ	appointed	by	SEC	staff	pur-
suant	 to	 the	OPM’s	 competitive	hiring	process	 conducted	a	hearing	
and	 issued	an	 initial	decision	 finding	violations	and	 imposing	 sanc-
tions.76	The	defendant	argued	that	the	ALJ’s	decision	was	invalid	be-





































decision.82	 Because	 SEC	 ALJs	 were	 therefore	 officers	 of	 the	 United	
States,	 they	 could	 not	 be	 appointed	 by	 SEC	 staff,	 and	 the	 Court	 re-




































































stitutional	 because	 they	 “are	 not	 an	 inappropriate	 impediment	 to	 executive	 power	
given	the	constitutional	pedigree	of	the	APA	and	the	legitimate	need	for	decisional	in-
dependence	for	adjudicators.”	Id.	at	14–15.	
















































	 89.	 See	5	U.S.C.	§	557(b)	(“On	appeal	 from	or	review	of	the	 initial	decision,	the	
agency	has	all	the	powers	which	it	would	have	in	making	the	initial	decision	except	as	
it	may	limit	the	issues	on	notice	or	by	rule.”).	
	 90.	 See	 infra	notes	 168–75	 and	 accompanying	 text	 (discussing	 interaction	 be-







021025PM	 [https://perma.cc/C7MF-S7HL]	 (“On	 July	 16,	 2018,	 the	 Acting	 Commis-
sioner	ratified	the	appointment	of	ALJs	and	AAJs	and	approved	their	appointments	as	











































No.	 89-554,	 §§	 3317–18,	 80	 Stat.	 378,	 421	 (1966).	 The	 Civil	 Service	 Commission	
adopted	regulations	explicitly	extending	civil	service	hiring	procedures	to	hearing	ex-




























appointment	 process,	 including	 “whether	 competitive	 examination	
and	competitive	service	selection	procedures	are	compatible	with	the	


















































itive	 service	 appointments	 process.	 This	 explicit	 language	 was	
omitted,	however,	when	the	APA	was	 later	recodified.105	Other	civil	
service	safeguards	for	the	independence	of	hearing	examiners,	includ-


















	 106.	 See	Pub.	L.	No.	89-554,	§	7521,	80	Stat.	378,	528	 (1966)	 (enacting	5	U.S.C.	
§	7521).	
	 107.	 The	Civil	Service	Commission	and	later	the	OPM,	however,	promulgated	reg-
ulations	 explicitly	 subjecting	 ALJs	 to	 the	 competitive	 hiring	 process.	 See	 5	 C.F.R.	
§	930.204(a)	(2020)	(“An	agency	may	appoint	an	individual	to	an	administrative	law	





































































service	 hiring	 process.116	 In	 addition,	 OPM’s	 statutory	 authority	 to	
 



























as	nearly	as	conditions	of	good	administration	warrant,	 for	 .	.	.	 (1)	necessary	excep-
tions	of	positions	from	the	competitive	service;	and	(2)	necessary	exceptions	from	the	






vious	 Presidents	 have	 amended	 OPM	 regulations	 by	 executive	 or-
der.118	









































	 122.	 Id.	 at	 116	 (“In	 sum,	 assuming	without	 deciding	 that	 the	 national	 interests	
identified	by	the	petitioners	would	adequately	support	an	explicit	determination	by	


























cause	 it	 fails	 to	provide	an	adequate	explanation	 for	 the	exemption	
and	 is	 therefore	 arbitrary	 and	 capricious.	Had	 the	 amendments	 in-
cluded	in	the	order	been	adopted	by	OPM,	the	agency	would	have	had	
to	 comply	with	APA	notice	 and	 comment	procedures,	 and	 it	would	






















































utive	 order	was	not	 itself	 subject	 to	 the	 procedural	 requirements	 of	 the	APA,	 even	



















the	 order.	 Thus,	 the	 President	 of	 the	 Association	 of	 Administrative	
Law	 Judges	declared	 in	an	op-ed	published	 in	 the	Washington	Post	




















adjudication”);	 Jack	 Beermann,	 The	 Future	 of	 Administrative	 Law	 Judge	 Selection,	
REGUL.	REV.	 (Oct.	 29,	2019),	 https://www.theregreview.org/2019/10/29/beermann	
-administrative-law-judge-selection	 [https://perma.cc/K4ZE-NHKJ]	 (arguing	 that	
“moving	the	hiring	process	into	the	agencies	themselves	.	.	.	presents	the	danger	of	po-


























or	other	disciplinary	action	 in	retaliation	for	decisions	 in	 individual	
cases	are	even	more	essential.136	As	discussed	above,	the	APA	and	civil	




















































First,	 the	Court	held	 in	Free	Enterprise	Fund	 that	 two	 layers	of	
good-cause	protection	impermissibly	interfered	with	the	President’s	





pointed	 by	 the	 SEC	 to	 staggered	 five-year	 terms,147	 and	 the	 Act	
 





































faithfully	 executing	 the	 laws	 because	 he	 could	 not	 hold	 either	 the	














































icymaking)	 functions,	 and	 their	 possession	 in	 some	 instances	 of	
“purely	recommendatory	powers.”156		
These	 points,	 however,	 are	 not	 especially	 convincing	 for	 three	
reasons.157	 Lucia,	 of	 course,	 subsequently	 held	 that	 SEC	 ALJs	 are	
 






















vice	 as	 long	 as	 they	 remain	 in	 their	 current	 positions),	 Exec.	 Order	 No.	 13,843,	
§	3(a)(iv),	Excepting	Administrative	Law	Judges	from	the	Competitive	Service,	83	Fed.	
Reg.	 32,755,	 32,757	 (July	 13,	 2018).	Nonetheless,	 Justice	Breyer	 estimated	 that	 the	
Court’s	decision	put	the	job	security	of	hundreds	or	thousands	of	government	officials,	








































































ALJs	 are	employed	by	 the	Social	 Security	Administration	 (SSA)	and	




Whether	 the	principal	 is	 the	employing	agency	or	 the	MSPB	 is	
also	relevant	to	the	proper	remedy	in	the	event	that	dual	good-cause	
removal	provisions	for	ALJs	are	invalid.	In	Free	Enterprise	Fund,	the	
Court	 severed	 the	 Public	 Company	 Accounting	 Board’s	 good-cause	
protections,	leaving	the	good-cause	removal	requirements	for	the	SEC	
intact.168	 As	 noted	 above,	 the	 Solicitor	 General	 proposed	 a	 similar	
remedy	in	Lucia,	which	would	allow	the	SEC	to	remove	ALJs	at	will.169	
An	alternative	remedy,	however,	would	be	to	sever	the	good-cause	re-








of	 the	merits.’”	 (citations	omitted)).	For	 further	discussion	of	 the	Solicitor	General’s	
position	on	good-cause	removal	for	ALJs,	see	 infra	notes	188–96	and	accompanying	
text	(discussing	Guidance	Memorandum	seeking	to	weaken	good-cause	protections).	































determine	whether	 to	 invalidate	 the	 good-cause	 removal	 provision	

































independence	 of	 the	 employing	 agency,	moreover,	might	 indirectly	





















































are	 constrained	 in	 their	 review	 by	 limited	 resources,	 however,	 the	
availability	of	de	novo	agency	review	may	be	insufficient	to	justify	the	
conclusion	that	ALJs	are	inferior	officers.182	If	not,	a	court	might	inval-
























2.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/QL5C-CLQL]	 (reporting	 that	 there	 were	 562,452	 ALJ	 deci-
sions	and	106,575	Appeals	Council	Decisions	in	that	year).	The	same	may	be	true	of	
agency	adjudicators	who	are	not	administrative	law	judges	protected	by	the	APA’s	de-





































	 185.	 First,	 Judge	Kavanaugh	 authored	 the	majority	 opinion	 for	 a	 panel	 decision	
that	 invalidated	 the	 good-cause	 removal	provision	 for	 the	CFPB,	PHH	Corp.	 v.	 Con-
sumer	Fin.	Prot.	Bureau,	839	F.3d	1	(D.C.	Cir.	2016),	but	that	decision	was	reversed	by	
the	circuit	sitting	en	banc.	881	F.3d	75	(D.C.	Cir.	2018).	The	Fifth	Circuit,	however,	in-
































even	 billion-dollar	 penalties	 through	 administrative	 adjudications	
and	civil	actions.”193		
The	Court	thus	framed	the	question	as	“whether	to	extend	those	




ture.”195	 In	 so	doing,	 the	Court	 concluded	 that	 the	 lack	of	historical	
analogies	was	a	strong	indicator	that	the	CFPB’s	structure	was	uncon-

















































dent	 for	 the	CFPB	Director	 in	part	because	 the	good-cause	removal	
provision	 for	 the	 Commissioner	 was	 controversial	 and	 “President	
Clinton	 contested	 [its]	 constitutionality.”203	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	
Court	also	distinguished	the	SSA	from	the	CFPB,	observing	that	“unlike	



































The	 reasoning	of	Seila	Law,	 however,	has	broader	 implications	
for	good-cause	removal	provisions	as	applied	to	ALJs	in	general	and	
without	regard	to	whether	they	are	supervised	by	a	principal	officer	
subject	 to	good-cause	 removal	provisions.	 Insofar	as	Seila	Law	rea-
soned	that	presidential	removal	at	will	is	the	rule,	and	good-cause	re-
strictions	are	the	exceptions,207	good-cause	 limitations	on	ALJs	may	
violate	Article	 II.	At	 the	very	 least,	defenders	of	good-cause	protec-
tions	 for	 ALJ	 independence	must	 establish	 that	 these	 positions	 fall	
within	the	recognized	exceptions	based	on	Humphrey’s	Executor	and	




























Lucia	 sparked	 President	 Trump’s	 Executive	 Order	 exempting	 ALJs	
from	competitive	 civil-service	hiring,	 the	uncertainties	 surrounding	
good-cause	 removal	 provisions	 for	 federal	 officers	 has	 fueled	 the	
Trump	Administration’s	efforts	to	weaken	good-cause	protections	for	
ALJs.211	In	particular,	the	Solicitor	General	issued	guidance	indicating	
that	 the	 Justice	 Department	 will	 defend	 against	 challenges	 to	 ALJ	
good-cause	 removal	 requirements	 only	 if	 these	provisions	 are	 con-
strued	 to	 allow	 agency	 heads	 to	 exercise	 sufficient	 control	 over	
ALJs.212	






































First,	 although	 Free	 Enterprise	 Fund	 only	 held	 that	 dual	 good-
cause	removal	requirements	were	constitutionally	invalid,	the	Guid-
ance	Memorandum	makes	no	effort	to	differentiate	between	ALJs	em-
ployed	 by	 executive	 and	 independent	 agencies,	 suggesting	 instead	
that	Department	Heads	must	be	able	to	exercise	control	over	ALJs.216	
In	 this	 respect,	 the	 Guidance	Memorandum’s	 analysis	 would	 apply	

















































In	 short,	 the	 Guidance	 Memorandum	 represents	 an	 especially	
strong	assertion	of	the	unitary	executive	principle	in	which	Article	II’s	
demands	 for	presidential	 control	of	executive	officers	outweigh	 the	
need	to	protect	the	procedural	due	process	rights	of	parties	to	admin-
istrative	adjudications	by	ensuring	the	impartiality	and	independence	
of	 adjudicatory	 officials.	 Under	 this	 view,	 although	 ALJs	 are	 called	
“judges,”	they	are	first	and	foremost	executive	officers	whose	duty	is	
to	carry	out	the	policy	of	the	political	leaders	of	the	agency.	Thus,	it	is	















































particular	 case	 and	 systemic	 influence	 to	 drive	 outcomes	 in	 a	 pre-


































proper	 influence	 in	 individual	cases	cannot	be	discounted.224	None-
theless,	this	concern	does	not	strike	us	as	the	most	serious	problem	
with	the	erosion	of	ALJ	independence.	Neither	the	precedents	nor	the	
executive	 actions	 discussed	 above	 suggest	 that	 the	 President	 or	
agency	heads	have	the	power	to	appoint	and	remove	ALJs	to	achieve	
a	 desired	 outcome	 in	 an	 individual	 case.225	 As	 a	 practical	 matter,	
moreover,	appointments	are	at	best	an	indirect	way	to	influence	the	
outcome	in	particular	cases.226	While	removal	may	be	a	more	direct	



















Drop	 Case,	 LAW.COM	 (May	 11,	 2020),	 https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/	
2020/05/11/thousands-of-ex-prosecutors-urge-flynn-judge-to-question-barrs-move	
-to-drop-case	[https://perma.cc/KST6-68QR].	
	 225.	 Even	 the	 Solicitor	 General	 acknowledged	 this	 limitation	 on	 the	 removal	





















visions,	 and	 other	 APA	 safeguards,	 such	 as	 restrictions	 on	 perfor-
mance	 evaluations	 for	 ALJs,	 protect	 against	 this	 sort	 of	 systemic	















	 229.	 See	Priscilla	Alvarez,	 Immigration	 Judges	Quit	 in	Response	to	Administration	
Policies,	CNN	POLITICS	 (Dec.	27,	2019),	https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/27/politics/	
immigration-judges-resign/index.html	[https://perma.cc/NDL4-5423]	(describing	an	














































































efits	 to	 “those	 claimants	 with	 slight	 abnormalities	 that	 do	 not	






adjudications	 as	 the	 SSA,	 through	 a	 combination	 of	 nonlegislative	
rules,	personnel	manuals,	and	internal	memoranda,	directed	ALJs,	for	
example,	 to	 refuse	 to	consider	 the	combined	effects	of	multiple	 im-
pairments,	 disregard	 claimants’	 subjective	 complaints	 of	 pain,	 and	
discount	 the	opinions	of	 claimants’	 treating	physicians.240	Although	
many	of	these	policies	were	invalidated	by	courts,	the	SSA	followed	a	
policy	of	“non-acquiescence”	whereby	 it	would	 instruct	agency	per-
sonnel	 to	disregard	 judicial	decisions	 invalidating	agency	policies—
even	in	the	circuit	 in	which	the	 judicial	decisions	were	rendered.241	




















	 239.	 Dixon,	 54	F.3d	 at	 1029–31	 (recounting	 the	use	of	 policy	 guidance,	 instruc-
tional	manuals,	and	less	formal	controls	to	produce	systematic	misapplication	of	the	
severity	regulations).	



















influence	 ALJs,	 including	 increased	 efforts	 to	 remove	 them,	 re-
strictions	on	travel	privileges,	denial	of	staff,	and	letters	advising	ALJs	
 


























on	a	district	court	 finding	that	 the	program	was	 intended	to	and	did	alter	ALJ	deci-
sions),	modified	on	denial	of	reh’g	en	banc,	819	F.2d	237	(9th	Cir.	1987).	But	cf.	NLRB	v.	
Ohio	New	&	Rebuilt	Parts,	Inc.,	760	F.2d	1443,	1451–52	(6th	Cir.	1985)	(holding	that	
































































ministration.”255	More	specifically,	 the	SSA	has	stated	 that	 “[w]e	re-




sages,	 and	 the	Hearings,	 Appeals	 and	 Litigation	 Law	Manual	 (HAL-
LEX).”256	 It	 has	 taken	 this	 position	 despite	 judicial	 rulings	 that	 the	
agency’s	nonlegislative	rules,	such	as	HALLEX,	do	not	create	binding	
obligations.257	Although	it	may	be	proper	for	agencies	to	rely	on	non-





















































































As	 Part	 II	makes	 clear,	 some	 sort	 of	 congressional	 response	 is	
necessary	 to	 address	 constitutional	 issues	 and	 reinforce	 ALJ	 inde-
pendence.263	 Indeed,	 notwithstanding	our	hyper-partisan	 times,	we	
hope	 that	 this	will	be	regarded	as	a	nonpartisan	 issue.264	Both	pro-
gressives	and	conservatives	should	be	concerned	that	overzealous	po-
litical	appointees	will	try	to	exert	improper	influence	over	adjudica-











ment	 should	 consider”);	 REVISED	MODEL	STATE	ADMIN.	PROC.	ACT	prefatory	 note	 at	 6	
(UNIF.	L.	COMM’N	2010)	(explaining	that	“[t]he	growth	of	central	panel	agencies	in	the	
states	since	the	adoption	of	the	1981	Act	has	been	significant	with	25	states	currently	





	 264.	 See,	e.g.,	 Jessie	Bur,	Bipartisan	Bill	Would	Counter	Administrative	Law	Judge	























sions	 and	 executive	 actions.	 Restoring	 competitive	 civil	 service	 ap-
pointments,	for	example,	would	be	a	fairly	straightforward	proposi-










tive”	concern.	 In	contrast,	 concerns	over	agency	pressure	 to	wrongfully	deny	Social	
Security	disability	benefits	is	a	more	“progressive”	concern.	































There	 is	 no	 obvious	 legislative	 fix	 for	 the	 dual	 good-cause	 is-


















The	MSPB	adds	an	additional	wrinkle,	 as	 some	 judges	and	 liti-



















	 273.	 See	 supra	notes	202–07	and	accompanying	 text	 (discussing	 implications	of	










cause	 removal	protections	 for	 independent	 agencies	by	 eliminating	
them	for	the	MSPB,	but	that	solution	is	problematic	as	well.	In	the	first	
place,	it	may	not	be	sufficient	if,	as	we	suspect,	the	agency	head	is	the	
relevant	 principal.276	 Even	 if	 the	 dual	 good-cause	 removal	 problem	
could	 be	 solved	 by	 removing	 good-cause	 protections	 for	 the	MSPB	
(without	eliminating	good-cause	removal	for	the	independent	agen-
cies	employing	ALJs),277	the	MSPB	is	intended	to	be	an	independent	
adjudicatory	body,278	 and	politicizing	 it	would	 create	 its	own	prob-
























	 276.	 Professor	Jellum	has	suggested	that	 it	may	be	necessary	to	eliminate	good-
cause	protections	for	both	the	employing	agency	head	and	the	MSPB.	See	Jellum,	supra	
note	157,	at	743–44	(arguing	that	even	ALJs	in	executive	agencies	whose	head	is	re-






	 279.	 See	Michael	 B.	 Rappaport,	Replacing	 Agency	 Adjudication	with	 Independent	
Administrative	Courts,	26	GEO.	MASON	L.	REV.	811,	812	(2019)	(arguing	that	“the	use	of	
genuinely	independent	courts	that	have	expertise	and	that	use	the	streamlined	proce-








eral	 reasons,	 we	 think	 that	 an	 Article	 III	 court	 is	 a	 political	 “non-
starter.”	An	Article	I	court	would	be	more	politically	feasible	but	ulti-
mately	suffers	from	most	of	the	same	problems.		






































	 284.	 See	 supra	 notes	 14–19	 and	 accompanying	 text	 (analyzing	 recent	 Supreme	
































tection	 and	 representative	 democracy	 absent	 viable	 checks	 on	 the	 presidential	 ap-
pointment	powers”).	
	 285.	 See,	e.g.,	Beermann,	supra	note	131.	



































decisions	of	 an	Article	 I	 court.295	We	are	not	 aware	of	 any	Article	 I	
court	that	follows	such	a	model.296		
 
to	 remove	 them.	 See	 supra	 notes	 198–99	 and	 accompanying	 text	 (discussing	 Seila	






























administrative	 court	 to	 address	 current	 threats	 to	 independent	
agency	adjudication,	we	think	another	option	warrants	consideration:	
the	central	panel	model.	A	properly	structured	central	panel	of	inde-





judicators	 are	 not	 part	 of	 the	 agency	 for	 which	 they	 adjudicate	
cases.297	The	Uniform	Law	Commission	recommended	this	approach	
in	 the	 Revised	Model	 State	 Administrative	 Procedure	 Act	 (Revised	





































discipline	 them	pursuant	 to	 the	state’s	merit	 system	 law	and	 to	 re-
move	 them	 for	good	cause.303	The	Revised	Model	Act	 contemplates	
that	an	ALJ	may	be	given	final	decisional	authority,	or	that	the	judge	
may	issue	a	recommended	decision	subject	to	a	final	determination	by	






idea,	 and	 proposals	 to	 adopt	 one	 have	 surfaced	 periodically	 in	 the	
past.	 The	 so-called	 Heflin	 Bill,	 introduced	 in	 1983	 and	 again	 in	
1993,306	would	have	created	a	central	panel	of	federal	ALJs,	but	that	
bill	 was	 not	 adopted.	 Although	 some	 commentators	 supported	 the	


































Administrative	 Conference	 of	 the	 United	 States	 (ACUS)	 declined	 to	
recommend	that	the	federal	government	create	a	central	panel	“at	this	
time.”309	

















































ence	 in	a	manner	 that	 is	consistent	with	 the	constitutional	 require-
ments	for	appointment	and	removal	of	ALJs,	while	preserving	agency	
expertise	 and	policy	 authority	 and	 clarifying	 the	 appropriate	 scope	
and	means	of	agency	policy	control	over	ALJ	decisions.	
1. Locating	the	Agency	
An	 initial	question	would	be	where	 to	 locate	a	central	panel	of	
ALJs.	Two	options	come	immediately	to	mind:	the	panel	could	be	lo-
























-sentencing.html	 [https://perma.cc/5H9P-FZN9]	 (discussing	 concerns	 that	 the	 De-
partment	of	Justice	has	become	highly	politicized).	
	 313.	 Id.	




































The	appointment	of	ALJs	 to	 the	 central	panel	 should	be	merit-
based	and	apolitical	to	the	largest	extent	possible.	 In	this	respect,	 it	























sure	 strong	 protection	 for	 ALJ	 independence	 without	 violating	 the	
President’s	removal	power.	The	good-cause	requirements	themselves	
should	be	clearly	and	strongly	written	to	preclude	the	Solicitor	Gen-
eral’s	 narrowing	 construction,	 which	 is	 an	 extreme	 reading	 of	 the	
President’s	removal	power	for	quasi-judicial	officers	that	is	not	con-
stitutionally	 required	 under	 current	 doctrine.322	 Strong	 good-cause	
removal	requirements,	however,	may	be	problematic	for	two	reasons.	
First,	they	increase	the	likelihood	that	the	Court	might	hold	that	such	












































would	otherwise	arise	 from	an	agency’s	ability	 to	remove	ALJs	 that	
conduct	adjudications	on	its	behalf.	
If	 ALJs	 are	 to	 be	 protected	 by	 good-cause	 removal	 provisions,	
however,	 it	 follows	 from	 Free	 Enterprise	 Fund	 that	 the	 dual	 good-
cause	removal	problem	must	be	avoided,	which	has	implications	for	
both	 the	 central	 panel	 itself	 and	 the	 process	 for	 determining	 good	
cause.327	With	respect	 to	 the	central	panel	 itself,	 the	most	constitu-
tionally	prudent	path	would	be	to	allow	the	panel’s	head	to	be	remov-
able	by	the	President	at	will.328	This	approach	would	also	avoid	any	































argument	 that	 good-cause	 removal	provisions	 for	 the	MSPB	or	 any	

































e.g.,	Alexander	v.	Sandoval,	532	U.S.	275,	286–93	(2001)	 (holding	 there	 is	no	 “free-
































agencies	 that	employ	a	 relatively	 large	number	of	ALJs,	 such	as	 the	
NLRB.338	For	agencies	that	use	ALJs	only	occasionally,	however,	a	pool	











	 336.	 See	Disability	 Reviews,	 supra	 note	 233,	 at	 6	 (opening	 statement	 of	 Senator	
Levin)	(indicating	the	growing	number	of	cases	reviewed	each	year	by	SSA	ALJs).	




























making	 authority.	 Moreover,	 these	 policies	 are	 vetted	 through	
 































rulemaking	 or	 adjudicatory	 procedures	 and	 are	 transparent,	 in	 the	
sense	that	they	are	formally	adopted	and	published	by	the	agency.		
Because	 ALJs	 are	 not	 part	 of	 the	 agency	 itself,	 however,	 the	
agency	would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 use	 internal	 policies	 that	 are	 de	 facto	
binding	to	control	ALJ	adjudication.	This	limitation	would	mean	that	
an	 agency	 could	not	 bind	 central	 panel	ALJs	 to	nonlegislative	 rules	
that	are	not	vetted	through	notice	and	comment,	although	such	poli-
cies	might	warrant	some	deference	in	ALJ	adjudications,	just	as	courts	
afford	 them	 some	deference.	 Critically,	moreover,	 an	 agency	would	
not	be	able	to	issue	other,	less	formal	guidance	or	instruction	and	pun-
ish	ALJs	who	do	not	follow	it.	In	other	words,	although	agencies	could	





ent	 administrative	 adjudication.345	 In	 adopting	 statutes	 such	 as	 the	
APA	and	the	CSRA,	Congress	has	created	a	carefully	considered	series	
of	safeguards	to	shield	ALJs	from	improper	influence	while	conducting	
formal	 adjudications	 in	which	 the	 government	 is	 a	 party.346	 At	 the	
same	time,	by	allowing	agencies	to	review	the	decisions	of	their	ALJs,	
Congress	reserved	to	those	agencies	control	over	the	exercise	of	dis-









for	ALJs348	 poses	a	 serious	 threat	 to	 the	 independence	of	ALJs.	The	
















stitutional	 requirements	 for	 appointment	 and	 removal	 of	 ALJs	 that	
have	emerged	from	recent	judicial	decisions.349	There	are	various	op-
tions	to	constitutionally	reconstruct	safeguards	for	ALJ	independence.	








the	 adoption	 of	 the	 central	 panel	model	 that	 has	 been	 successfully	
used	 in	many	states.352	ALJs	would	no	 longer	work	for	the	agencies	
whose	 cases	 they	 adjudicate,	 but	 rather	 for	 a	 freestanding	 agency	
headed	by	a	 chief	ALJ.	Appointments	 to	 the	central	panel	would	be	
merit-based,	and	good-cause	removal	would	be	within	the	domain	of	
the	chief	ALJ,	who	would	be	removable	by	 the	President	at	will.	To	
protect	 agency	 policymaking	 discretion,	 agencies	 could	 adjudicate	
cases	themselves	rather	than	refer	them	to	the	central	panel,	and	they	
could	review	ALJ	decisions.	Agencies,	however,	would	not	be	able	to	

















	 355.	 See	Exec.	Order	No.	13,843,	Excepting	Administrative	Law	 Judges	 from	the	
Competitive	Service,	83	Fed.	Reg.	32,755	(July	13,	2018).	
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impartiality	of	ALJs	should	be	a	goal	to	which	all	corners	of	the	politi-
cal	spectrum	can	subscribe.	Adopting	the	central	panel	model	can	help	
restore	that	important	component	of	good	governance.	
